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wages of high-skilled workers, while there are no significant effects on low-skilled workers. This is fully consistent with the assumptions in our theoretical model where only the wages of skilled workers are firm specific and therefore can respond to an increase in firm productivity from hiring foreign experts.
The analysis in the present paper is also closely related to a growing literature on productivity spillovers across firms through the mobility of high-skilled workers. In this literature, it is analyzed whether workers with experience from high-productivity firms increase the productivity of their subsequent employers. Parotta and Pozzoli (2012) and Stoyanov and Zubanov (2012) both find such types of spillovers in the case of Danish firms, while Serafinelli (2014) finds evidence of this in the Venetto region of Italy. Balsvik (2011) finds productivity spillovers when Norwegian firms hire workers with experience from multinational firms.
There is also an extensive literature on how immigrant workers affect the wages and employment of native workers; see, e.g., Card (1990 Card ( , 2001 , Borjas (2003) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) . However, to the best of our knowledge, only Markusen and Trofimenko (2009) consider the possibility that foreign experts play a special role for the productivity of domestic firms. They set up a theoretical model where foreign experts may teach local employees new "tricks" and in this way increase their productivity. Using data on Columbian firms, they find that the employment of foreign experts increases firm productivity and the wages of the local employees. 1 The idea that foreign experts raise the productivity of local workers by teaching them new "tricks" seems most relevant in the context of developing countries. However, our results show that even in a high-income country, there may be gains from introducing foreign experts in a firm.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we discuss the theoretical background. Section III outlines the empirical framework, and Section IV presents the data.
Section V contains the empirical analysis, and Section VI concludes.
II. Theoretical background
The main contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence of the effects of hiring foreign experts on firm performance. In order to guide our empirical analysis in terms of modelling approach and choice of control variables, this section outlines an O-Ring model extended to the case of foreign experts. Below, we provide a brief account of the main assumptions and predictions, while the details of the model are relegated to an appendix available online.
If foreign experts should improve the overall performance of a firm, they should be complementary to other inputs in the firm. Lazear (1999) discusses some quite general conditions under which foreign workers and native workers constitute complementary inputs in the production process. He also argues that it is costly to include workers from different countries in the same organization as different languages and different cultures must be integrated. The importance of complementarities vs. the cost of communication determines whether a firm obtains a net gain from using foreign workers.
A well-known theory of complementarities between skills is the so-called O-Ring theory by Kremer (1993) , where the productivity of a worker is strongly increasing in the productivity of her co-workers. 2 As a consequence, high-skilled workers tend to cluster in some firms and low-skilled workers in other firms. 3 Specifically, the O-Ring model assumes that the Accepted Article production process consists of many strongly complementary tasks, where the probability of successful completion of a task depends on the quality (skills) of the worker(s) assigned to the task, and the model does not allow quantity to substitute for quality within a task.
In our paper, the strong complementarities of the O-Ring model are used to argue why foreign experts may increase the overall productivity of a firm. In doing this, we extend the model by Kremer (1993) in four important ways.
First, we introduce a horizontal dimension in the skill composition of educated workers in addition to the vertical dimension used in the original model. Specifically, we assume that among workers with a certain level of skills (the vertical dimension), there is a difference with respect to how well their specific types of skills fit the needs of a given firm (the horizontal dimension). As an example, consider two persons who both hold an MBA degree from a prestigious business school, and who both have 10 years of management experience from successful companies. The market value of these two persons may be identical, but they may not fit the needs of a specific company equally well. Such a horizontal difference could be due to different specializations across business schools or between programs within schools, or it could be due to work experience from different types of firms. Thus, an important difference between the vertical skill dimension and the horizontal skill dimension is that the vertical dimension can be measured by the market value of a worker, whereas the horizontal dimension is often impossible to measure directly in empirical analyses. Instead, the ability to find the right skills in the horizontal dimension will show up in the observed total factor productivity (TFP) of the firm. Note that the horizontal dimension is assumed only to apply to the highskilled (educated) workers, as these are the ones that handle the specialized tasks in the firm.
concentration of previous immigrants of the same nationality. Gianetti (2003) uses the clustering result to explain why high-skilled workers tend to migrate to rich regions, and Kreickemeier and Wrona (2011) apply it in a context where high-ability workers select into being emigrants (which is costly) in order to signal to firms that they are high-quality workers.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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Second, in line with Lazear (1999) , we assume that it is costly to hire foreign experts.
Along the horizontal dimension, firms seek to employ workers with skills as close as possible to the ideal skills required to perform the tasks in question. The thicker the market is in which firms are searching, the more likely the firm will be to find a candidate with ideal or "close-toideal" skills. Hence, a firm that searches in both foreign and local markets has a better chance of finding a candidate with the right skills than a firm that searches only in local markets.
However, searching in foreign labour markets is more costly than searching only in local markets, and it may also be more costly to hire a foreigner than a local worker.
Third, in the spirit of Melitz (2003) and a large subsequent theoretical and empirical literature, we also assume that firms are heterogeneous with respect to an exogenous productivity parameter. That is, some firms are inherently more productive than other firms, e.g., because they have a better "business idea" or a more able manager. Observed TFP then depends both on the exogenous productivity parameter and the match quality in the horizontal dimension, i.e., whether the firm hires foreign experts.
Finally, wages are assumed to be firm specific for the skilled workers. Firm-specific wages may arise if firms have monopsony power in the labour market (Manning, 2003) , i.e., if labour supply is (partly) firm specific. Recent evidence suggests that such firm-specific labour supply curves do exist; see, e.g., Falch (2010) and Staiger et al. (2010) . Alternatively, firmspecific wages may be the result of imperfectly competitive goods markets and rent sharing between firms and workers, either through bargaining or through efficiency wages; see, e.g., Egger and Kreickemeier (2009) and Amiti and Davis (2012) . There is also considerable evidence of this taking place in practice; see, e.g., Blanchflower et al. (1996) , Hildretch and Oswald (1997) and Arai (2003) .
In the appendix, the firm-specific wages are modelled as the result of rent sharing between the firm and the skilled workers, but we would get qualitatively similar results if we This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
had instead assumed that labour supply was firm specific. In both cases, an increase in observed TFP (e.g., because a foreign expert is hired) will increase the wages of the high-skilled workers. 4 Note that it is only the wages of high-skilled workers that are assumed to be firm specific. Low-skilled workers are easier to replace, as they do not differ in the horizontal dimension, which limits the likelihood of rent sharing and firm-specific labour supply curves.
As shown in the appendix, the model implies the existence of a critical value of the firm-specific search-and-hiring cost such that only firms with costs below this level will extend their recruitment efforts to foreign markets. It is also shown that the critical value depends negatively on the exogenous firm-specific productivity parameter, due to a complementarity between this parameter and the quality of the horizontal match. For the same reason, the costs of other inputs also affect the critical value. Hence, firms with a low search-and-hiring cost or with a high exogenous productivity parameter will extend their search for skilled workers to foreign markets and will therefore be more likely to employ foreign experts. As a consequence, these firms will have higher levels of variable profits and observed TFP, and they will also pay higher (skilled) wages than otherwise similar firms that do not try to recruit in foreign markets.
An implication of the model is that firms can start employing foreign experts for three different reasons (or a combination of these). First, a drop in the firm-specific search-and-hiring cost that takes it below the critical value will cause a firm to start recruiting foreign experts, thereby causing an increase in observed TFP, profits and (skilled) wages of the firm.
Second, the employment of a foreign expert may be the result of an increase in the exogenous productivity parameter, as this lowers the firm-specific critical value by making it more important for the firm to obtain a better horizontal quality of labour input. In this case,
observed productivity, profits and (skilled) wages will increase for all firms experiencing an increase in their exogenous productivity, but more if it also induces the firm to recruit foreign experts.
Third, changes in general framework conditions such as the cost of capital or the general wage level will affect the critical values of all firms but only cause some of them (the marginal ones) to start recruiting foreign experts. As in the second case, the performance of all firms will be affected, but more positively for those who start recruiting foreign experts. In all cases, the size of the effect also depends on the initial firm characteristics.
III. Empirical framework
Our theory model implies that firms that use foreign experts are both more productive and profitable and therefore pay higher wages than other firms. This is both because the foreign experts ensure a better match between tasks and skills, and because it is the most productive firms that benefit most from employing foreign experts. Thus, as the previous section also argued, firms may start recruiting foreign experts for three different reasons (or a combination of these): (1) a reduction in the firm-specific search-and-hiring cost; (2) an increase in the firmspecific exogenous productivity parameter; and (3) changes in the general framework conditions. In the first case, the associated changes in firm performance can be given a causal interpretation, while in the second and third case, we need to isolate the effect of the foreign experts from the effects of the exogenous productivity increase and the changes in the framework conditions.
Hence, to identify the causal effects on firm performance from hiring foreign experts, we must pay special attention to selection effects, and therefore we apply a difference-indifferences matching estimator (Heckman et al., 1997) . 5 That is, we compare the change in
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performance in firms that hire foreign experts (the treatment group) to that in other firms which have similar initial characteristics and which realize the same exogenous changes (or lack of changes) in productivity, but where the firm-specific search-and-hiring costs remain above the critical value (the control group).
By using a difference-in-differences approach, we eliminate the effects of timeinvariant factors (such as differences in exogenous productivity) and the effects of common changes in framework conditions that affect firm performance. However, initial firm characteristics affect not only initial performance and the likelihood of hiring foreign experts (those closest to the critical value are more likely), but also the effects of hiring these. By using a matched difference-in-differences approach, we can match on these initial characteristics, whereas a conventional difference-in-differences approach would require us to make assumptions (either explicitly or implicitly) about the functional form of these effects in order to identify any causal effects of hiring foreign experts. In this sense, matched difference-indifferences is a more robust approach than conventional difference-in-differences.
Furthermore, we need also to match on exogenous productivity changes as these affect both observed performance, the likelihood of hiring foreign experts and the effects of these.
Matching on the exogenous productivity development is, of course, complicated by the fact that the exogenous part of productivity is unobservable, and the literature on productionfunction estimation has long struggled with this issue using different proxies for exogenous productivity shocks; see, e.g., Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) .
In this paper, we match on a number of variables that are likely to capture these shocks or changes. First, we require that the firms in the control group also hire new experts, but local experts instead of foreign experts. Furthermore, we match on the wages of the foreign and domestic experts (where we impute the wage of the foreign experts in the cases where this information is missing). By matching firms that hire foreign experts with firms that hire This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
(similarly paid) domestic experts, we hope to get a treatment and a control group that have been hit by similar exogenous productivity shocks, but where the treatment firms have decided (due to lower search-and-hiring costs) to hire a foreign expert instead of a domestic one.
Second, we match on firm-specific demand shocks. These are constructed from information about each firm's sales broken down by product codes combined with information about changes in demand at the international markets obtained from UN trade statistics. The idea is that a large part of the unobserved firm-specific productivity shocks stems from better capacity utilization or higher output prices due to changes in demand. This is a more direct way to account for a potentially important portion of firm-specific shocks than the proxy variable approaches by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) . Finally, we match on the initial average wage growth in the firm. We take this as an indicator of the historical productivity changes in the firm and use it as a predictor of future exogenous productivity changes. While we expect past and future productivity changes to be positively correlated, this is not required. As long as past and future productivity changes are not uncorrelated, matching on past growth will still help to control for future exogenous productivity changes.
Matching with many covariates, as in our case, leads to a dimensionality problem, so we use the propensity score method (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to summarise the vector of matching characteristics, , into a single-index variable, the propensity score, ( ). The propensity score is the conditional probability that a firm hires a foreign expert. The first step in the matching analysis is to estimate the propensity score for the firms in the treatment and the control groups using a probit model. In Section V, we discuss in detail the variables included in the model.
Having estimated the propensity score for all treatment and control firms, we can estimate the average effect of hiring foreign experts among the treated firms, the so-called "average treatment effect on the treated" (ATET). This is done by comparing the change in
performance of a treated firm with the change in performance of one or more firms in the control group with similar propensity scores. In this way, we compare the changes in performance in firms which have similar initial characteristics.
Specifically, the matching difference-in-differences (MDID) estimator takes the following form:
where ∆ denotes the difference in the wage level (or another measure of firm performance)
in treatment firm j before and after a foreign expert is hired. In the analysis, we use both firmand worker-level measures of firm performance. and are the sets of treatment and control firms, respectively, and N1 is the number of treatment firms in the set 1 ∩ , where denotes the common support region of the propensity score. Hence, 1 ∩ is the set of treatment firms for which at least one matching control firm can be found. Δ is the change in the wage level in control firm i, and ( , ) is the weight given to this firm when compared with treatment firm j. These weights are constructed such that they depend on the distance in propensity scores between firm j and firm i.
In the analysis, we use different versions of the MDID estimator, which differ in the way the weights of the control firms are determined. First, nearest-neighbour matching uses only one control firm for each treatment firm (the one with the propensity score closest to the treatment firm, which is then given a weight of one), whereas local linear matching uses multiple control firms, where the weights of the controls are inversely proportional to the distance to the treatment firm. We also use nearest-neighbour matching with a caliper, which differs from standard nearest-neighbour matching in that a tolerance level for the propensity score distance is imposed such that particularly bad matches are avoided. In some of the 6 See Blundell and Costa-Dias (2009) for an exposition of the MDID estimator.
analyses, we also combine nearest-neighbour matching with exact matching on some of the covariates. I.e., in addition to matching on the propensity scores, we also match directly on the individual values of a subset of the covariates.
Finally, we also use matching combined with subsequent regression adjustment within the matched pairs as suggested by Imbens (2006, 2011) , Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Imbens (2015) . The idea is that instead of just comparing the outcomes of treated and controls as in (1), a regression is used to adjust for any remaining imbalances in the values of the individual covariates of treatment and control firms after the initial matching on propensity scores has taken place; see Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Imbens (2015) for details. This approach also allows us to control for clustering of error terms at the firm level in the cases where we use worker-level measures of performance in a more standard way than that suggested by Hanson and Sunderam (2012) .
IV. Data
We have access to a very rich matched worker-firm longitudinal data set covering the total Danish population of workers and firms for the years 1995-2007. The source of the firm data is the Firm Statistics Register (FirmStat), which provides annual information on industry affiliation (six-digit NACE code), the number of full-time employees, sales and export volume.
The FirmStat associates each firm with a unique identifier, which allows us to track the same firm over time.
Detailed information on individual socio-economic characteristics is available on an annual basis. There is information about, e.g., age, sex, citizenship, labour market experience, tenure, education and a wage rate calculated as annual labour income divided by annual working hours. In the following, we distinguish between high-skilled, medium-skilled and lowskilled workers. High-skilled workers refer to persons with a tertiary education according to
the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Medium-skilled workers have
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a vocational education defined as the final stage of secondary education that prepares students for entry into the labour market. Finally, persons with the equivalent of high school education or less are classified as low-skilled workers.
7
These individual level variables are extracted from the integrated database for labour market research (IDA) and the income registers in Statistics Denmark. The IDA also associates each person with a unique identifier, which allows us to track workers over time.
To match the firm data with the worker data we draw on the Firm-Integrated Database for Labour Market Research (FIDA), which for a given year links every firm in the FirmStat with all the workers in the IDA who are employed by that firm in week 48 of the given year.
Foreign experts
Our data on foreign experts are provided by the Danish tax authorities who record information about firms hiring foreign experts that are eligible for reduced income taxation under the "Tax scheme for foreign researchers and key employees". This data set uses the same firm and worker identifiers as FIDA, allowing us to match the data with our worker-firm data on an annual basis.
The tax scheme was introduced in 1992 and applies a flat tax rate of around 30 %, which is much lower than the normal tax rates in the Danish tax system (the highest marginal tax rate was around 60 % in the period under consideration). Before 2002, foreign experts were eligible for the reduced tax rate for the first three years, but if their stay in Denmark extended seven years, they were liable to pay a reimbursement tax equivalent to the subsidy obtained in the first three years. In 2002 this reimbursement tax was abolished such that the foreign experts can now stay in Denmark as long as they wish without paying any additional taxes to 7 Note that, while tertiary and vocational education prepare the students for specific types of functions/jobs in the labour market, a high-school degree in itself does not qualify for certain positions. Thus, in the Danish labour market, a person with a high-school degree would typically compete for the same type of jobs as a person with just the mandatory level of education.
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compensate for the subsidy in the first three years. As this change makes it easier to attract foreign experts, it ensures some exogenous variation in the search-and-hiring costs of the firms in the period under consideration.
To be eligible for the reduced tax rate some requirements must be met. The most important ones are the following. First, the employee should not have been liable to pay taxes in Denmark for the previous three years. This implies that not only foreigners but also Danes who have stayed abroad for more than three years may be eligible for the reduced tax rate.
Throughout this paper, we include these persons among the "foreign" experts, as they must all be recruited from abroad, and hence are likely associated with higher search-and-hiring costs than purely domestic experts. The second requirement is that it does not count as years abroad if a person was expatriated by his or her Danish employer. Third, the monthly salary of the person should be above a threshold level which in 2007 was DKK 65,408 (corresponding to around 8,800 Euros). Hence, this threshold level of income is effectively what defines an expert: A person who has a sufficiently high productivity to command this salary. It should be mentioned that foreign experts may be eligible for the low tax rate in jobs paying wages below the threshold level if they are employed by a university or a research institution. However, in the following we restrict attention to the foreign experts employed in private firms, where they are all required to have a wage higher than the threshold level.
In Figure 1 , we illustrate the development in the number of foreign experts in private firms. Note that it is a relatively low number of employees who by our definition are classified as foreign experts. In 1995 there were around 600, and this number had increased to around 1700 in 2007. Most of the foreign experts are hired in the service sector; only around 25 % are employed in manufacturing. Note also that the reform in 2002 did not cause a major increase in the number of experts.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. Table 1 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. The data also allow us to analyse whether foreign and domestic experts are employed in similar occupations. In the following, we define domestic experts as native employees receiving a wage above the level required to be eligible for the reduced tax scheme for foreign workers. Not surprisingly, both foreign and domestic experts are employed in more advanced This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

occupations such as Managers, Professionals, and Technicians and associate professionals;
see Table 3 . However, foreign experts are slightly more concentrated in the top-2 occupations (Managers and Professionals) than domestic experts. This is consistent with foreign experts earning somewhat higher wages despite being of roughly the same age and gender composition as domestic experts; see Table 3 .
Firms with foreign experts
In the following, we focus on private sector firms with at least 10 full-time employees, as the use of experts is likely to play a different (less specialized) role in smaller firms. Table 4 displays the total number of firms in our sample (column 1), the number of firms with foreign experts (column 2) and the number of firms with domestic experts (column 3). Only a minority of the firms have foreign experts in their workforce -less than 600 out of approximately 20,000
firms employ foreign experts in 2007. In contrast, around half of the firms use domestic experts. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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The fourth column of Table 4 shows the number of firms that start to use foreign experts in a given year. These observations will constitute the treatment group in the matching analysis below. A firm is classified as a treatment firm if the following three conditions are met: (i) it is observed in at least five consecutive years: − 2, −1, , + 1 and + 2; (ii) it does not employ foreign experts in − 1 and − 2 (and − 3 if present in that year as well); and (iii) it is observed with at least one foreign expert among its employees in year . 8 For = 1997, there are 48 firms that satisfy these conditions. In total, there are 557 firms in the treatment group in Table 4 . Around 30 of these are dropped in the subsequent matching analysis because of missing observations or the common support requirement.
The observations in column 5 constitute the control group. These are firms that are observed in at least five consecutive years, − 2, − 1, , + 1 and + 2, and which hired at least one domestic expert in year . Note that these conditions imply that a given firm can enter the control group with more than one observation if it satisfies the above requirements for, e.g., both = 1998 and = 1999. In column 5, there is a total of 23,791 control observations, but 8 Note that it is not sufficient that the wage of a foreign employee increases above the threshold level for him/her to qualify as an expert. The foreign expert must be a new hire.
(1) Note: The sample includes manufacturing and service firms w ith at least 10 employees. The firms in column 4 are firms w hich: (i) are observed in at least five consecutive years, t -2, t -1, t , t +1 and t +2; (ii) do not employ foreign experts in t -2 and t -1; (iii) are observed w ith at least one foreign expert in t . Firms in column 5 are observed in at least five consecutive years, t -2, t -1, t , t +1 and t +2, and hired at least one domestic expert in year t . See text for definition of foreign experts.
Table 4. Number of Danish private sector firms with and without foreign experts.
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in the matching analysis we impose the additional requirement that these firms should not hire foreign experts in any of the five years or earlier sample years, which reduces the control sample to around 14,000 observations.
Firms that start to hire foreign experts are different from firms that do not. Table 5 reports the results of simple regressions where the treatment and control observations are compared. The dependent variable is a firm characteristic measured in − 1 (the year prior to treatment), and the explanatory variable is the treatment indicator. It is seen that firms that hire foreign experts are bigger, have higher sales, export more, use more high-skilled labour, use more domestic experts and pay higher wages. These differences persist when including industry fixed effects and firm size as additional controls, and it suggests that selection effects play an important role as predicted by our theory. Firms that hire foreign experts are on average different from firms that do not hire foreign experts, and it is necessary to appropriately control for these selection effects, if we wish to uncover the causal effects of the foreign experts. Table 5 showed that average wages are higher in firms employing foreign experts. This is consistent with our theory model, which predicts that the incentive to hire foreign experts is higher in the more productive firms. Thus, to identify the causal effect of hiring foreign experts, we argued in Section III that we must compare the development in firms that hire foreign experts to that in other firms which have both similar initial characteristics and which realize the same exogenous changes in productivity. This section therefore contains the results of the difference-in-differences matching analysis described in Section III.
V. Results
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First, we consider the effect on firm-level outcomes, in particular the average wages in the firms. As firm-level measures may be affected by composition effects, we subsequently consider the effects on individual wages. We also investigate one particular channel through which foreign experts may complement other inputs: knowledge of foreign markets. To test this, we analyse whether foreign experts are used to promote exporting activities.
Firm-level outcomes
The first step in applying the MDID estimator is to predict the propensity scores for all treatment and control observations. In estimating the probit model, we include a number of initial firm characteristics measured in − 1 (the year before hiring foreign experts for the treatment firms).
The initial firm characteristics included are expected to reflect the initial productivity level and the initial composition of factor inputs. Hence, we include the log of the average wage level as this is likely to depend on firm productivity, cf. Section II. 9 We include two 9 Note that with the initial wage level included among the covariates, the difference between difference-indifferences matching and cross-sectional matching (in levels) becomes smaller. Still, when matching is not done directly on the initial wage level, but through the propensity score, MDID more effectively removes the effects of time-invariant differences.
(1) This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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measures of firm size (the number of full-time employees and firm sales) as size is typically found to be strongly correlated with productivity; see, e.g., Oi and Idson (1999) . We also include two measures of export activity (an exporter dummy and the share of exports in total sales), as exporting activity is also found to be associated with higher productivity; see, e.g., Bernard and Jensen (1995) and Bernard et al. (2007) . When it comes to the composition of factor inputs, we include the shares of high-and medium-skilled workers in firm employment as well as the share of domestic experts. We also include year and industry dummies.
As argued in Section III, we also include the average wage growth between t -2 and t -1 among the covariates as an indicator of the historical productivity growth in the firm and therefore as a predictor of future exogenous productivity growth. Sales growth between t -2 and t -1 is also included to control for trends in firm performance. Furthermore, control firms are all required to hire a domestic expert in period t as explained in Section IV. We also include the wage level of the newly hired experts and our proxy for firm-specific demand shocks among the covariates in the probit model. 10 The latter is included as two dummy variables: One if the shock is in the range of 0-15 % and another if the shock exceeds 15 %. Table 6 shows the results from the estimation of the probit model. It is seen that large firms (as measured by sales) with higher initial average wages, high export-to-sales ratios, a large share of high-skilled workers and a high expert wage level are more likely to hire foreign experts. This is fully consistent with the theory model from Section II. More surprisingly, the share of domestic experts and the initial wage level do not significantly affect the probability of hiring a foreign expert. On the other hand, the firm-specific demand shocks (WID growth) significantly affect the probability of hiring foreign experts.
10 Not all foreign experts are observed with an hourly wage rate in the data. To avoid loss of observations, we predict these missing wage rates from a Mincer wage regression using data for all foreign experts observed; see the online data appendix for details. As explained in Section III, the demand shock variable is constructed from changes in world import demand for each firm's initial product mix. For details, see the online data appendix.
Having predicted the propensity scores from the probit model above, the next step is to estimate the ATET using the matching estimators described in Section III. However, as we are not matching directly on the covariates but on the propensity scores, it has to be checked that this procedure is able to balance the distributions of the relevant covariates across the treatment and the matched control firms. Table 7 displays the standardized biases for the variables in the probit model when using the local linear matching estimator. The standardized bias shows the difference in sample means in the treated and matched control subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of sample variances in both groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) . This is one way to evaluate the quality of the match. Matching generally reduces the bias substantially for all variables, so that the treatment and control groups are comparable after matching. In particular, This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
there are no significant differences in covariate means for the two groups after matching (pvalues all exceed 0.25).
It turns out that using nearest-neighbour matching results in a somewhat lower match quality, but still the standardized bias does not exceed 10 % for any covariates (out of 29).
Hence, in the following, we focus on the results when using local linear matching. The nearestneighbour matching results, which are very similar, are available in an online appendix.
The first row of Table 8 shows the effect (ATET) of hiring foreign experts on the change in average wages (defined as the wage bill divided with the number of employees) between year − 1 and (the year where foreign experts are hired). Surprisingly, we find a negative effect on this outcome, which, however, after two years (in t + 2) is changed to a significantly positive effect of almost 2.4 %. That is, in firms hiring foreign experts, average wages increase by 2.4 % more than in similar firms hiring only domestic experts.
There might be several reasons why it takes some years for the effects of the foreign expert to materialize. One is that they need time to implement new technologies/methods in Note: The standardized bias for a given variable is defined as the difference in means betw een the treated firms and the matched comparison group scaled by the average variances. The explanatory variables are (unless otherw ise indicated) from t -1, the year before an expert is hired.
the Danish firms. Another is that wages are not negotiated on a daily basis, implying that productivity changes show up later in wage changes.
In Table 8 , it is also reported how firm-level sales, sales per worker, total employment and the skill composition are affected by the hiring of foreign experts. Although the effects are estimated to be insignificant, employment tends to decrease (the effect is close to being significant), while sales tend not to be affected, such that sales per worker rises. This also suggests that productivity tends to increase in firms that hire foreign experts.
One particular channel through which foreign workers may improve the performance of a domestic firm is knowledge of foreign markets (Lazear, 1999) . Such knowledge will be Note: All treatment effects are calculated using local-linear matching. The dependent variables are measured as the difference in outcome betw een t -1 (the year before treatment) and t or t +1 or t +2 (as indicated). A common support restriction has been imposed.
relevant if the firm wants to expand its export activities. To examine this hypothesis, we test whether firms tend to take up or increase their exporting activities after hiring foreign experts.
We find that when a foreign expert is hired instead of a domestic expert, the firm increases its export propensity by 2.7 percentage points the following year. Moreover, we find that the export intensity increases significantly by 1.3-1.7 % in all three years following the employment of a foreign expert. This strongly suggests that firms use the foreign experts to increase their activities at foreign markets.
Finally, Table 8 shows that the composition of workers changes within the firm when a foreign expert is hired. The share of medium-skilled workers declines, while the share of high-skilled workers increases. This suggests that the increase in average wages may be driven by compositional changes within the firm. Below, we investigate this issue further.
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Worker-level outcomes
In this Section, we exploit the wealth of information in our matched worker-firm data to circumvent the impact of within-firm compositional changes on the average wage. We do this by focussing on changes in individual wages.
In this case, the treatment and control observations consist of all workers who remain in the treatment and control firms in all five years (t − 2 to t + 2). This yields almost 100,000 treatment observations (of which 13 % are lost due to the common support requirement) and around one million control observations. When estimating the propensity score, we match on the same firm characteristics as above but also include a number of worker characteristics such as the initial wage, age, marital status, number of children, education, labour market experience, tenure in the firm, occupation, region of residence and immigrant status. To ensure
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that we match with workers experiencing similar trends in wage growth, we also include individual wage growth between year t -3 and t -2 and between t -2 and t -1.
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The matching problem is different in the worker-level analysis as workers in a large treated firm will not necessarily be matched with the corresponding workers in a similarly large control firm because worker characteristics now also enter the probit model. As a result it is more challenging to obtain a high match quality, and so we report results from using a number of different matching estimators Panel A in Table 9 reports results from using the same local linear matching estimator as in the firm-level analysis. Treatment effects are shown for the full sample of workers remaining in their firms in at least five years and for low-skilled, medium-skilled and highskilled workers separately. For the full sample, the effects tend to be negative, which is driven by negative effects for low-skilled and medium-skilled workers, while high-skilled workers gain from the employment of a foreign expert. However, the quality of the match for the firmlevel covariates is in general worse than that obtained in the firm-level analysis, while matching quality is better for the covariates at the worker level. To be specific, for several of the firmlevel covariates, the standardized biases after matching exceed 10 %. Like in the firm-level analysis, the simple nearest neighbour matching estimator does not improve the match quality. Instead we consider in Panel B the nearest neighbour estimator where we have imposed a caliper to ensure the distance in propensity scores between matched pairs does not exceed a certain threshold. Clearly, this estimator comes with the cost of a greater loss of observations, but the match quality does improve considerably, although several firmlevel covariates still exhibit standardized biases in the range 5-10 % and with averages between treated and controls being significantly different.
For the full sample, we find a significant and positive effect on wages of 0.4 % in year t + 2. The effects in the two previous years are also positive but insignificant. However, when we split the sample into skill groups, we find larger significant effects in the range of 0.4 to 0.8 % for medium-and high-skilled workers (although not in year t +1 for medium-skilled workers). The effects are still considerably smaller numerically than when using average wages, which lends support to the idea that compositional changes are also important for the development in average wages.
So far we have entered industry and year dummies in the probit models, such that on average the treated and control workers have the same distribution across industries and years.
A problem with this might be that the estimates are obtained by comparing workers across Note: Nearest neighbor treatment effects are calculated w ith replacement. The caliper in panels B, C, D and E is set to 0.00001. The dependent variables are measured as the difference in outcome betw een t -1 (the year before treatment) and t or t +1 or t +2 (as indicated). A common support restriction has been imposed. The selected covariates in panel E are: average w age, average w age grow th, sales grow th, size, size squared, share of high skilled w orkers, share of medium skilled w orkers, the tw o demand shock dummies, expert w ages, individual w age grow th variables, industry dummies and year dummies. T-statistics have not been corrected for clustering at the firm level or for bias resulting from calculated propensity scores in panels A, B and C. In panel D and E standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level. As noted above some imbalances between treated and control observations remain when using the Panel B estimator. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Imbens (2015) , among others, argue that more robust results may be obtained if the estimation is run in two steps, where the first step is the pairing of treated and controls as discussed so far. The second step involves an adjustment by running an OLS regression of the outcome variable on the treatment indicator and all or some of the covariates from step one. In Panel D we follow this approach by running the adjustment regression on the matched sample obtained from Panel B using all covariates from step one. We also cluster standard errors at the firm level in the adjustment regression. The adjustment reinforces the effects for high-skilled workers while effects are no longer significantly different from zero for low-and medium-skilled workers.
Inclusion of all covariates in the adjustment regression may be too demanding and, e.g., Imbens (2015) suggests selecting covariates based on economic considerations. In Panel E we only include firm-level covariates that play an important role in our identification discussion (e.g. average wage and wage growth, firm size, worker composition, demand shocks and expert wages), while worker-level covariates (except the wage growth variables) are left out since they are better balanced in step one. In this case, the effects for low-and medium skilled workers remain insignificant (in year t + 2 the effect is significant at the 10 % level), while for high-skilled workers, the wage effects are now significant at the 5 % level in year t and at the 10 % level in year t + 2. Two years after hiring a foreign expert, wages of high-skilled workers
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rise by 1.0 %. That wage effects are most pronounced for the high-skilled workers is consistent with the idea that it is mainly for high-skilled workers that wages are firm specific as argued in Section II. 14 So we take our results as evidence that wages respond to an increase in the productivity of the firm only for high-skilled workers.
It was evident from Table 3 that more than a third of all foreign experts are employed as managers, and managers are usually not thought of as experts in the same way as, e.g., STEM workers. To examine if there is a differential impact of hiring foreign managers as opposed to other foreign experts, we split the treatment group in two, depending on managerial status, and use the specification in Panel E in Table 9 . When doing this, we find that hiring a foreign expert in a non-managerial position has a positive impact (significant at the 10 % level)
on wages of both medium-and high-skilled workers. By contrast, hiring a foreign manager only has a positive impact on wages of high-skilled workers (significant at the 10 % level), but the magnitude of the effect is larger than for foreign experts hired in non-managerial positions.
15
As a robustness check we assess the validity of our identification approach by estimating "placebo" treatment effects, where the treatment for worker i in firm j at time t is defined as the arrival of a foreign expert at firm j in year t + k. That is, we estimate effects of treatment in years prior to the hiring of foreign experts in the firms. Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) stress that the absence of such placebo effects cannot be considered a test of our identifying assumption, but it would make it more plausible that it holds.
In Table 10 we use the model from Panel E in Table 9 to estimate placebo treatment effects. We find no significant effects of treatment three, four or five years prior to actual 14 Note also that the Danish labour market is characterised by wage bargaining being more centralized for lowskilled workers than for high-skilled workers. Hence, firm-level bargaining and, therefore, firm-specific wages are more pronounced among high-skilled workers than among low-skilled workers, see, e.g., Dahl, le Maire and Munch (2013) . 15 The detailed results are available in the online appendix.
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treatment in year t (except for a negative effect for low-skilled workers in year t -2 when placebo treatment is given in year t -3). Treatment in year t -2 leads to a significantly positive effect for high-skilled workers in year t, which is consistent with the results from Table 9 , Panel E. If the placebo treatment is given in year t -1 we also find positive effects for high-skilled workers in years t and t + 1, while the effect in year t -1 is insignificant. Overall, we take comfort in the absence of placebo effects in the vast majority of cases.
VI. Conclusion
It is well known that certain types of labour, e.g., STEM workers, may be particularly important for productivity growth. But do foreign experts contribute even more to the productivity growth of firms than similar domestic experts? This is the core question addressed in this paper. Note: Nearest neighbor treatment effects are calculated w ith replacement. A common support restriction and a caliper set to 0.00001 have been imposed. Results are obtained from a step tw o adjustment regression as in Panel E of Table 9 . The dependent variables are measured as the difference in outcome betw een the year before placebo treatment and the three subsequent years (as indicated). T-statistics are corrected for clustering at the firm level. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
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We argue that there may exist strong complementarities between the knowledge (skills) of foreign experts and native workers in a company, implying that a few foreign experts may give rise to a significant increase in firm productivity. By applying difference-in-differences matching techniques to a rich Danish data set, we find support for this hypothesis. The average wage level in the firm increases significantly by 2.3 % in the third year following the employment of a foreign expert. We take this as evidence of a positive productivity effect.
Using worker-level information, we can account for firm-level composition effects. We find that wages increase significantly for high-skilled workers in the three years after the foreign expert has arrived (0.7-1.2 %). This is fully consistent with the hypothesis that it is mainly the wages of high-skilled workers being firm-specific, and, therefore, responding to productivity changes of the firm. The fact that average wages increase more than individual wages, also indicates that an upgrade in the composition of firm employment takes place following the employment of a foreign expert.
A main conclusion of our analysis is that the use of foreign experts has a value beyond that of domestic experts. Furthermore, this value benefits not only the foreign experts themselves and the firms that hire them, but also native workers. In particular, high-skilled coworkers seem to benefit from the arrival of foreign experts. Hence, our results lend support to the idea that it may be optimal for countries to subsidise the hiring of foreign experts.
